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MEANS OF FIGHTING PRETRIAL
CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bail Reform Act of 19841 authorizes judicial officers to de-
tain a defendant before trial if the officer determines that the de-
fendant is likely to commit a crime while on release pending trial. 2
The United States Courts of Appeal and District Courts have con-
sistently upheld the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act (herein-
after "BRA") under the fifth and eighth amendments. 3 Recently,
I Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041-3043,
3062, 3141-3150, 3154, 3156, 3731, 3772, 4282 (1985)).
2 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(4) ("Upon the appearance before ajudicial officer of a person
charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial the
person be ... detained pursuant to the provisions of subsection (e)").
3 United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 546 (1st Cir. 1986)(upholding the consti-
tutionality of BRA in reliance on ChiefJudge Feinberg's dissent in United States v. Sa-
lerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986)); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.
1986)("We join all other courts in the country which have either implicitly or explicitly
held that the Bail Reform Act does not violate the fifth or eighth amendment."); United
States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986)("Nevertheless, Congress has pro-
vided a rational scheme for limiting the duration of federal pretrial detention and we
decline to hold the Bail Reform Act unconstitutional for omitting the probable duration
of pretrial incarceration."); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 118 (3d Cir.
1986)("We hold that the second preventive detention provision in section 3142 (e) of
the Bail Reform Act does not violate the eighth amendment, substantive due process,
procedural due process, equal protection, or the sixth amendment."); United States v.
Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985)("The Court... believes the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 to be constitutional and adopts the reasoning set forth in
greater detail in United States v. Edwards."); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283,
1287 (N.D. Cal. 1985)("[T]his court agrees with the Carlson dictum that the excessive
bail clause of the Eighth Amendment does not preclude Congress from enacting a law
that provides for pretrial detention without bail in certain types of cases."); United
States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Having considered the par-
ties' papers and oral arguments, the court finds that the [Bail Reform] Act can be con-
strued so as to preserve its constitutionality."); United States v. Rawls, 620 F. Supp.
1358, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985). "[T]his court is of the opinion that the defendant's eighth
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however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that preventive detention violates the Due Process Clause of
the fifth amendment.4
This Comment focuses on the opinions of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Melendez-Carrion5 and Salerno v. United States6 to deter-
mine the constitutionality of BRA. 7 First, after summarizing BRA,
this Comment argues that preventive detention is constitutional
under the fifth amendment because it passes each of the three fac-
tors of the Supreme Court's "legislative purpose" test." Second,
this Comment argues that the opinions of Chief Judge Feinberg in
Melendez-Carrion9 and Salerno 10 provide a more thorough due pro-
amendment rights are not violated by sections 3142(e) and (f) of the Bail Reform Act of
1984.")
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D.P.R. 1984)("The defendant
argues that his pretrial detention without bail contravenes the Eighth Amendment's pro-
scription against excessive bail .... We disagree .... The right to bail [is] ... not an
absolute constitutional right. The excessive bail clause of the Eighth Amendment was
never intended to restrict what offenses could be deemed bailable."), aft'd, 755 F.2d 203
(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)("[U]nder the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish... the [Bail Reform]
Act is a constitutionally permissible regulatory, rather than penal, sanction."); United
States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1449, 1450-52 (N.D. Ill. 1984)("[T]his Court is
satisfied that the Eighth Amendment did not prevent Congress from enacting the pre-
trial detention provision in the [Bail Reform] act." The court also held that BRA did not
violate the fifth amendment's due process clause).
4 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986); Salerno v. United
States, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, motion for expedited review granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1986)(No. 86-87).
5 790 F.2d 984, 1005-09 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring)(2d Cir. 1986).
6 794 F.2d 64, 75-79 (Feinberg, Cj., dissenting)(2d Cir. 1986).
7 This Comment focuses on the opinions of the Second Circuit because they con-
sider the constitutionality of BRA under substantive due process. Melendez, 790 F.2d
984, 1000-03; Salerno, 794 F.2d 72-74. The Third and Seventh Circuits have focused
more narrowly on procedural due process. Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1003-04 ("In Portes, the
Seventh Circuit does not discuss the more fundamental question whether the substan-
tive component of due process permits a person not convicted of a crime to be confined
for any purpose not related to the conduct of an impending trial .... Delker [Third
Circuit] also analyzed the issue solely as one of procedural due process."); See Portes, 786
F.2d 758, 767-68; United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397-98 (3d Cir. 1985). The
First Circuit has adopted without further elaboration the substantive due process rea-
soning developed by Chief Judge Feinberg of the Second Circuit. Zannino, 798 F.2d
544, 546 ("[W]e are in agreement with the dissenting opinion of Judge Feinberg in
Salerno that this aspect of the Act does not violate substantive due process.").
8 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Though the Court did not use the phrase "legislative purpose test," this Comment will
use that phrase to describe the Bell Court's test given the emphasis placed on legislative
intent by the Court. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text, and infra note 38 for
evidence of the Court's reliance on legislative purpose in testing the constitutionality of
pretrial detention.
9 790 F.2d 984, 1005-09 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring)(2d Cir. 1986).
10 794 F.2d 64, 75-79 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting) (2d Cir. 1986).
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cess analysis than the Supreme Court's "legislative purpose" test in
his suggestion that the length of pretrial detention be added as a
factor in the due process analysis. Finally, this Comment concludes
that Congress should have chosen a less constitutionally suspect
means of fighting crime on bail and proposes alternative legislation
which would reduce pretrial crime more effectively.
II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
Prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, judicial officers could con-
sider only the risk of flight of the accused in determining bail in
non-capital cases. 1 Under BRA, a judicial officer, in addition to
considering the risk of flight, is required to consider "the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person's release."' 12
A judicial officer determines whether to detain the defendant at
a detention hearing which is held upon a motion by the federal gov-
ernment following the defendant's arrest. 13 At the hearing, the de-
fendant "has the right to be represented by counsel" and is given
the opportunity "to testify, to present witnesses on his own behalf,
to cross-examine witnesses ... and to present information by prof-
fer or otherwise."' 14 To detain the defendant, the judicial officer
must find "probable cause to believe that the person committed" an
enumerated offense "for which a maximum term of imprisonment
often years or more is prescribed."'' 5 If ajudicial officer makes such
a finding, then a rebuttable presumption is triggered "that no condi-
tion or combination of conditions [of release] will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community."' 6
The defendant may be detained without bail if the judicial of-
ficer, based upon certain enumerated factors, finds "clear and con-
vincing evidence" to support the presumption of dangerousness. 17
The factors to be considered include "the nature ... of the offense
charged, including whether [it is] ... a crime of violence or involves
a narcotic drug," the weight of the government's evidence, and the
"history and characteristics of the person," including his community
11 Note, The Loss of Innocence: Preventive Detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 806, 809-10 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Loss of Innocence] (citing and
construing 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966)(repealed 1984)).
12 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g)(4).
13 18 U.S.C. § 3142 ().
14 Id.
15 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e).
16 Id.
17 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (0).
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ties and criminal history. I8
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE TEST
The Supreme Court has reserved the question of whether a
court may detain adults prior to trial for reasons other than the risk
of flight. 19 In Bell v. Wolfish 20 the Court held that "a detainee may
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law." 2 ' The Court also recognized a "distinction be-
tween punitive measures that may not be constitutionally imposed
prior to an adjudication of guilt and regulatory restraints that
may."92
To determine whether preventive detention constitutes uncon-
stitutional punishment or permissible regulation, the Bell Court de-
veloped a three part "legislative purpose" test. The Bell Court
examined seven criteria set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez23 to
aid its determination of whether the statute imposed punishment
prior to adjudication or was permissibly regulatory. These criteria
were:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned. 24
The Bell Court narrowed these seven criteria into a three part test.
The Court stated that "[1] absent a showing of an express intent to
punish... [the] determination [of whether a statute imposed pun-
ishment or was regulatory] will turn on [2] whether an alternative
purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is as-
signable for it, and [3] whether [the detention] appears excessive in
18 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g).
19 Bell, 441 U.S. at 533-34 ("We are not concerned with the initial decision to detain
an accused and the curtailment of liberty that such a decision necessarily entails.");
Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (clarifying that it was considering the constitutionality of preven-
tive detention "in the context of the juvenile system.").
20 441 U.S. 531 (1979)(Court upheld as constitutional the conditions under which
pretrial detainees were held in a federal detention facility).
21 Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
22 Id. at 537 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
23 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Mendoza Court used these criteria to determine that
automatic forfeiture of citizenship provisions contained in the immigration laws consti-
tuted punishment which could not be applied to an alien without due process of law
under the fifth amendment. Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 167-70, 186.
24 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
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relation to the alternative purpose.' "25
Five years after Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of preventive detention ofjuveniles in Schall v. Martin.26 In
Schall, the Court reviewed a New York statute which authorized fam-
ily court judges to detain juveniles for a maximum period of seven-
teen days 27 if there is a serious risk that the defendant will commit a
crime while out on bail.28 In Schall, the Court was asked to deter-
mine whether preventive detention of juveniles was "compatible
with the fundamental fairness' required by due process." 29
The Schall Court used the criteria established in Bell to uphold
the statute on constitutional grounds. 30 First, the Court found that
there was no indication that the statute "is used or [was] intended
[to be used] as punishment." 3x Second, the Court found that the
statute served the alternative legitimate state objectives of protect-
ing society and the juvenile defendant from the consequences of his
or her future criminal acts. 32 Third, the Court found that secure
detention, while restrictive, was not excessive but was "consistent"
with the state's regulatory objectives.33
The Schall Court also noted that the procedural due process
safeguards of the statute were sufficient, even though the statute
gave the judge no guidance regarding what criteria3 4 or kinds of evi-
dence35 he should consider in deciding whether to detain a juvenile.
Further, in response to the petitioner's claim that it was impossible
to predict future criminal behavior, the Court said:
[F]rom a legal point of view, there is nothing inherently unattainable
about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such a judgement
forms an important element in many decisions, and we have specifi-
cally rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological
data relied on by appellees and the district court, "that it is impossible
to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be
meaningless." '36
Moreover, the Schall majority criticized the dissent for attempting
25 Bell, 441 U.S. 538 (quoting Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 168-169).
26 267 U.S. 253, 281 (1984).
27 Id. at 270.
28 Id. at 255 n.I (citing N.Y. [Family Court Act (29A)] § 320.5 (McKinney 1983)).
29 Id. at 263.
30 Id. at 269.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 265-66.
33 Id. at 271.
34 Id. at 279.
35 Id. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




to invade the legislature's role by redrafting the statute because in
their opinion it constituted poor social policy.3 7
The dissents in Bell and Schall ably noted the deficiencies of the
legislative purpose test, which relies heavily on a determination of
legislative intent. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Bell, emphasized
that due process demands a consideration of the potential punitive
effect of restraints on the detainee. 38 Justice Marshall asserted that
the majority's test was incapable of determining the effect of deten-
tion on detainees because the test did not consider whether deten-
tion constitutes an affirmative disability or whether it historically has
been regarded as a punishment as required by Mendoza.39 In addi-
tion, because of the "overwhelming" evidence that even "highly
trained criminologists" cannot accurately predict criminal behavior,
Justice Marshall reasoned that the New York statute did not meet its
purpose of preventing crime. 40 Because the statute did not advance
the asserted alternative governmental purpose of preventing crime,
Justice Marshall concluded that it was constitutionally "invalid in
toto" under the majority's test.4 1
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BRA UNDER THE SUPREME
COURT'S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE TEST
The legislative purpose test is comprised of three factors. The
first factor is whether Congress expressed an intention to punish
pretrial detainees. The second factor is whether Congress ex-
pressed an alternative intention to regulate the future behavior of
the detainee. The third factor is whether preventive detention is
excessive in relation to Congress's alternative intention to regulate
the future behavior of detainees.
A. FACTORS ONE AND TWO: WHETHER CONGRESS EXPRESSED AN
INTENT TO PUNISH OR TO REGULATE PRETRIAL DETAINEES
Factors one and two of the Bell test will be considered together.
To determine Congress's intent in enacting BRA, an examination of
the legislative history of BRA is essential. This examination begins
37 Id. at 281.
38 Bell, 441 U.S. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Due Process Clause focuses
on the nature of the deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them. If this concern is
to be vindicated, it is the effect of conditions of confinement, not the intent behind
them, that must be the focal point of the constitutional analysis.").
3) id. at 565.
40 Schall, 467 U.S. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 292-93.
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with an analysis of Congress' preventive detention statute for the
District of Columbia which was enacted in 1970.
After failing to enact an adult preventive detention statute for
the federal system, the Nixon administration secured the passage of
a preventive detention statute for the District of Columbia in
1970.42 In United States v. Edwards,43 Edwards and other defendants
unsuccessfully challenged the statute on fifth amendment grounds.
The defendants argued that preventive detention was "inevitably
... punishment" prior to an adjudication of guilt.4 4 The Edwards
court recognized that Bell narrowed the Mendoza criteria by "empha-
sizing governmental purpose as particularly significant in determin-
ing whether the challenged conditions imposed on pretrial
detainees were penal or regulatory." 45 The Edwards court con-
cluded, based upon the legislative history of the D.C. statute, that
Congress' aim was to "protect the safety of the community" and not
to punish the defendant.46 The court reasoned that the purpose of
pretrial detention was to "incapacitate the detainee from commit-
ting future crimes," not to promote the "traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence." 47
In, United States v. Portes,48 the court found that Congress ex-
pressly relied on the Edwards analysis to distinguish preventive de-
tention from punishment when drafting BRA.49 The Portes court
examined the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on BRA to reach
this conclusion.50 The Judiciary Committee report concluded:
With respect to the Due Process issue, the [Edwards] court concluded,
correctly in the view of the Committee, that pretrial detention is not
intended to promote the traditional aims of punishment such as retri-
42 See Ervin, Preventive Detention: A Species of Lydford Law, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113,
116 (1983). The District of Columbia preventive detention statute is codified at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-1321-32 (1983).
43 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982)).
44 Id. at 1331.
45 Id. at 1332.
46 Id. at 1332-33 (construing H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1970)).
47 Id. at 1333 (quoting in part Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 168). But see Note, The Loss of
Innocence, supra note 11, at 817 (BRA, like other criminal law measures, seeks to deter the
accused); Comment, Preventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent,
32 Am. U.L. REV. 191, 204 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Burdening the Innocent] (Preven-
tive detention "can have as much of a deterrent effect as any criminal sanction."); Tribe,
An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 U. VA. L. REV. 371,
379 n.30 (1970).
48 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1986). The court in Portes held that BRA does not violate
either the eighth or the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 766-68.
49 Id. at 767 (construing Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332-33; S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 8 (1983)) [hereinafter S. REP. 225]; Accord United States v. Acevedo-Ramos,
600 F. Supp. 501, 505 (D.P.R. 1984), aft'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985).
50 Portes, 786 F.2d at 767 (construing S. REP. No. 225, supra note 49, at 8).
1986] 445
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bution or deterrence, but rather that it is designed "to curtail reason-
ably predictable conduct, not to punish for prior acts," and thus,
under the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wofish, is a constitution-
ally permissible regulatory, rather than a penal, sanction.
Based on its own constitutional analysis and its review of the Ed-
wards decision, the Committee is satisfied that pretrial detention is not
per se unconstitutional. 5 1
The Judiciary Committee further emphasized its prospective, regu-
latory purpose in recommending the pretrial detention statute for
Senate approval. The Committee noted that
[T]here is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous de-
fendants as to whom neither the imposition of stringent release condi-
tions nor the prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure
the safety of the community or other persons. It is with respect to this
limited group that the courts must be given the power to deny release
pending trial.5 2
Courts, moreover, have noted that the language of BRA itself
suggests a regulatory rather than a punitive intent.53 Indeed, BRA
provides that detainees, where possible, are to be confined sepa-
rately from prisoners serving sentences or awaiting appeal.5 4 BRA
provides further that preventive detention is to be used sparingly,
only when stringent release conditions will not assure community
safety. 55 Finally, an arrestee may be detained before trial for only a
limited time period under the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act
which Congress applied to BRA.56
Courts have consistently followed the clearly expressed regula-
tory intention of Congress in construing BRA. 57 They have found
that Congress did not intend to punish arrestees, but only to regu-
late their future behavior.58 The Second Circuit, although it struck
51 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 49, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
52 Id. at 6-7.
53 United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1985)(holding that
preventive detention under BRA "is regulatory not punitive"); United States v. Hazzard,
598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(holding that Congress in enacting BRA did not
intend to punish detainees, but to protect the community against crimes detainees
would commit if released).
54 Freitas, 602 F. Supp. at 1291 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (i)(2) (1985)); Hazzard, 598 F.
Supp. at 1451 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (i)(2)).
55 Freitas, 602 F. Supp. at 1291 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)).
56 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(1)). But see infra notes 199-212 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the difficulties of limiting the length of pretrial detention under
BRA in multi-count, multi-defendant cases.
57 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58 Portes, 786 F.2d at 767 (drawing on Edwards, the court noted that "pre-trial deten-
tion was intended to protect the safety of the community, not to promote retribution or
deterrence."); Melendez-Canion, 790 F.2d at 1000 ("We are willing to assume that secton
3142 (e) was enacted by Congress primarily as a regulatory measure."); Kouyoumdjian,
601 F. Supp. at 1511 ("There is no indication that the Act seeks to promote such recog-
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down BRA as unconstitutional, was "willing to assume" that BRA
"was enacted by Congress primarily as a regulatory measure and
that its constitutionality should be determined accordingly."59
Therefore, preventive detention under BRA meets the first two
factors of the Supreme Court's legislative purpose test. First, Con-
gress did not express an intent to punish detainees. Second, Con-
gress expressed an intention to regulate the future conduct of
detainees in order to ensure the safety of the community.
B. FACTOR THREE: WHETHER PREVENTIVE DETENTION IS EXCESSIVE
IN RELATION TO ITS PURPOSE OF FIGHTING PRETRIAL CRIME
Whether preventive detention is excessive in relation to the
purpose of fighting pretrial crime poses difficult constitutional ques-
tions and will be considered in two parts. First, this Comment con-
siders whether preventive detention is excessive per se because it is
so inconsistent with our constitutional system of criminal justice as
to "shock the conscience." ' 60 Second, this Comment considers
whether the particular form of preventive detention provided by
BRA is excessive in relation to the purpose of fighting pretrial crime
because defendants may be detained who would not have commit-
ted crimes while out on bail.
1. Does Preventive Detention per se Violate our Constitutional Traditions?
a. The Argument Against Preventive Detention
The Second Circuit held in United States v. Melendez-Carrion6'
nized goals of punishment as retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation. The procedural
protections encompassed by the 1984 Act . . .accommodat[e] . . . the government's
interest in preventing flight before trial and protecting the safety of the community.");
Freitas, 602 F. Supp. at 1291 ("[T]he Court concludes that pretrial detention under the
new Bail Act is regulatory rather than punitive."); Rawls, 620 F. Supp. at 1360 ("The
Congressional history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 makes it abundantly clear that
pretrial detention is -intended to protect the safety of the community and is not designed
to punish a defendant for prior bad acts."); Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. at 505 ("The
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 indicates an intent to protect the com-
munity against persons likely to endanger it, and not as an intent to punish."), aft'd, 755
F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); Payden, 598 F. Supp. at 1392 ("The Act is not intended to
promote the traditional aims of punishment such as retribution or deterrence, but rather
... to curtail reasonably predictable conduct.' ").
59 Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1000.
60 For an explanation of the development of the phrase "shocks the conscience" in
the due process inquiry, see Rochin v. California 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)("Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . is conduct that
shocks the conscience."). Rochhi was referred to by the Schall Court in determining
whether BRA was consistent with due process. See Sciall, 467 U.S. at 268-69 n.18.
61 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986).
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and Salerno v. United States62 that preventive detention is inconsistent
with the traditions of our constitutional system of criminal justice
because "detention to prevent the commission of domestic crime
can constitutionally occur only after conviction." 63 The Second Cir-
cuit in Melendez and Salerno stated that preventive detention cannot
be upheld simply because it is a "rational means" to promote public
safety. 64 The court asserted that under a "rational means" test, the
federal government could also imprison people not accused of any
crime but who were deemed likely to commit future crimes. 65
The court in Melendez and Salerno reasoned that an indictment
or prior criminal record, both factors to be considered under BRA,
does not enhance the government's case for detention.66 Detaining
individuals under BRA on the basis of a prior arrest offends proce-
dural due process because individuals are punished for prior con-
duct without the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments. 67
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Jackson v. Indiana,68 that "pend-
ing criminal charges [do not] provide a greater justification for dif-
ferent treatment than conviction and sentence," 69 supports the
Second Circuit's argument. In addition, the Salerno court reasoned
that defendants traditionally have been detained prior to trial only
to prevent the flight of the accused, thereby protecting the integrity
of the judicial process. 70
Commentary regarding preventive detention supports the Sec-
ond Circuit's argument that preventive detention on the basis of
dangerousness violates our constitutional traditions. 71 Commenta-
tors have noted that BRA marks the first time that bail may be de-
nied for non-capital offenses on the basis of dangerousness, 72 a
statutory change that "marks a severe departure from the policy of
62 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
63 AMelendez, 790 F.2d at 1004.
64 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 72 (quoting Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1001).
65 Salerno, 794 F.2d. at 72.
66 Id.
67 Id. The court also noted that a person who has "paid the penality for his previous
crimes" cannot be "further incarcerated to protect the public." Id. at 73. ChiefJudge
Feinberg noted, however, that double jeopardy considerations protect the interests of
ex-convicts. See Id. at 77 n.l (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
68 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See infra note 69 for further information aboutJackson v.
Indiana.
69 Id. at 729. See also Note, The Loss of Innocence, supra note 11, at 822. Jackson dealt,
however, with an equal protection claim in the context of civil commitment, and not with
due process in the context of criminal procedure. Id.
70 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 73-74.
71 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.




prior federal law" which allowed detention only to prevent the ac-
cused from fleeing the court's jurisdiction. 73 Indeed, Senator Ervin
argued that the District of Columbia preventive detention statute
"pervert[s] the historic and legitimate purpose of bail-to assure the
appearance of the accused at trial."'74
After holding that detention based on an indictment or prior
criminal record violates our constitutional traditions, the Second
Circuit asserted that prophylactic measures in the pretrial period are
inconsistent with the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process. 75
The court stated:
The system of criminal justice contemplated by the Due Process
Clause ... is a system of announcing in statutes of adequate clarity
what conduct is prohibited and then invoking the penalties of the law
against those who have committed crimes. The liberty protected
under that system is premised on the accountability of free men and
women for what they have done, not for what they may do. The Due
Process Clause reflects the constitutional imperative that incarceration
to protect society from criminals may be accomplished only as punish-
ment of those convicted for past crimes and not as regulation of those
feared likely to commit future crimes. 76
There is also commentary supporting the Second Circuit's op-
position to prophylactic measures. For example, Professor Tribe
has opposed preventive detention on the basis of dangerousness.
He has distinguished it from civil commitment of the mentally un-
stable because a mentally disturbed individual cannot control his
impulses.7 7 Tribe reasoned, therefore, that detaining an individual
"capable of conforming to society's demands" is a peculiarly "offen-
sive anticipatory condemnation" that is inconsistent with constitu-
tional traditions.7 8
Finally, the court in Melendez concluded that preventive deten-
tion under BRA is analogous to the detention of adults ofJapanese
ancestry during World War 11.79 The court reasoned that the con-
cern regarding the possibility that Japanese-Americans were engag-
ing in espionage during World War II, which triggered Korematsu v.
United States,80 represented the "rare, possibly unique, circum-
73 Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of
1984, 134 U. PA. L REV. 225, 226 (1985).
74 Ervin, supra note 42, at 114 n.9; See Tribe, supra note 47 at 401-42.
75 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 72 (quoting Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1001).
76 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 72 (emphasis in original).
77 Tribe, supra note 47, at 378-79.
78 Tribe, supra note 47, at 379-80.
70) Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1004.
80 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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stance" in which detention comports with due process. 8' The
Melendez court concluded, however, that the prevention of domestic
crime does not justify preventive detention.8 2 The harsh tone of the
Second Circuit's analogy of preventive detention under BRA to the
detention in Korematsu was echoed by Senator Ervin.83 Senator Er-
vin characterized preventive detention as "a blueprint for a police
state" and a "[g]estapo-like" tactic.8 4
Thus, the Second Circuit in Melendez and Salerno advanced a
forceful argument that preventive detention per se violates our con-
stitutional traditions of fundamental fairness.
b. The Argument in Favor of Pretrial Detention
Chief Judge Feinberg's concurring opinion in Melendez and his
dissenting opinion in Salerno provide a more well-reasoned constitu-
tional analysis demonstrating why preventive detention does not per
se violate our constitutional traditions of fundamental fairness
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Chief Judge Feinberg conceded that placing a person in jail
"simply because he is thought to be dangerous is not part of our
tradition of liberty."8 15 He added, however, that the constitutionality
of detention under BRA was not as easy to resolve as the majority
suggested.8 6 Therefore, he rephrased the constitutional inquiry as:
[W]hether a defendant already indicted for a serious crime can be de-
nied bail in the pretrial period because there is clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant will otherwise commit another crime while
on release. 87
Chief Judge Feinberg skillfully pointed out that preventive
measures of confinement are an integral part of our criminal justice
system.88 He illustrated this point by noting that judges regularly
and legitimately depend upon predictions of future criminality in
determining the length of prison sentences and in granting bail after
conviction.8 9 Thus, he concluded that "[t]here is nothing inherently
shocking to the conscience in using a prediction of future criminality
81 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1004. The court, however, did question the continuing valid-
ity of Korenmatsu. Id. (construing Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.
Cal. 1984)).
82 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1004.
83 Ervin, supra note 42, at 115, 116 n.15.
84 Id.
85 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 77 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
86, Id.
87 Id.




to justify confinement." 90
Moreover, in the pretrial context, ChiefJudge Feinberg stated
that the Supreme Court in Gernstein v. Pugh9' approved detention
after arrest and before arraignment not only because detention
would prevent flight, but also because it would tend to "bar com-
mission of future crimes." 92 ChiefJudge Feinberg aptly concluded
that "[i]f the police may detain an arrestee for a short time to pre-
vent danger to the community pending a finding of probable cause,
Congress may direct judges to do the same after an indictment and
pending trial." 93
Three additional arguments which support Judge Feinberg's
position that preventive detention in the pretrial period is not in-
consistent with our constitutional traditions can be gleaned from the
legislative history of BRA94 and commentary regarding preventive
detention. 95
First, the Senate reasoned that by enacting BRA, Congress
merely exercised its traditional power to define which federal of-
fenses are bailable.96 The Senate Judiciary Committee argued that
Congress, like the British Parliament before it, has always retained
the right to define which offenses are bailable. 97 While inconsistent
Supreme Court dicta exists regarding whether Congress has the
power to deny bail for certain offenses, 98 the Judiciary Committee
chose instead to rely on Carlson v. Landon9 9 which stated that the
Constitution
[H]as not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in
which bail shall be allowed in this country. This [sic] in criminal cases,
90 Id.
91 Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-19 (1975)(fourth amendment requires aju-
dicial determination of probable cause prior to extended detention after arrest).
92 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 76 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting) (construing Gernstein, 420 U.S.
at 114).
93 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 76-77 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
94 See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
97 S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-11 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 147].
98 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)("From the passage of theJudiciary Act of 1789
... to the present... federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a
non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail."). However, the author of Stack, Chief
Justice Vinson, joined the majority opinion ofJustice Reed in Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952). See S. REP. No. 147, supra note 97, at 11. Stack, furthermore, upheld
the right of Congress to deny bail because of the risk of flight despite the statutory
traditions it discussed. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. See S. REP. No. 147, supra note 97, at 10-11.
Stack, moreover, framed its discussion of bail in terms of Congress' action to provide for
that right in both the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
99 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed,
the very language of the [Eighth] Amendment fails to say that all ar-
rests must be bailable.' 0 0
Congress, moreover, has exercised its power to define bailable
offenses in order to provide "official restraint prior to final judge-
ment of conviction."''1 1 For example, since 1789 Congress has re-
quired judicial officers to deny bail to arrestees charged with capital
crimes. 102 Further, the courts have upheld Congress' power to deny
bail in order to prevent the flight of the accused from the jurisdic-
tion by denying bail before trial,' 03 to prevent witness harassment
and jury tampering by denying bail during trial, 10 4 and to assure
community safety by denying bail pending appeal. 10 5
In addition, Congress reasoned that the exercise of its power to
define bailable offenses in an effort to prevent future crime is consis-
tent with legislative and judicial tradition. 10 6 The Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that considerations of community safety animated
the early surety system of bail in England and the United States. 0 7
The early surety system required that an individual "with the capac-
ity to control or influence" the arrestee's behavior "accept responsi-
100 S. REP. No. 147,supra note 97, at 11 (quoting Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545). The eighth
amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Dis-
cussion of whether the eighth amendment creates a constitutional right of bail is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For interesting discussions of the eighth amendment issue,
see Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33, 77-92 (1977)(bail is a
constitutional right); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, U. PA. L. REV. 457,
971-89 (1965)(bail is a constitutional right); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality
of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1225-31 (1969)(bail is not a constitutional
right); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA. L.
REV. 371, 377-79, 397, 400-02 (1970)(bail is a constitutional right).
While there is a division of opinion in the commentary regarding the status of the
right to bail, courts have held that "the overwhelming weight of authority indicates that
the Eighth Amendment is addressed only to the amount of bail set for a bailable offense,
but creates no right to bail for an offense made non-bailable by statute." Acevedo-Ramos,
600 F. Supp. at 507, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)(citing United States v. Abrahams,
575 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1978)); Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 964 (1981); United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1135 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958
(1979)). Accord Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1325-31.
101 Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1232 (arguing in favor of the constitutionality of pre-
ventive detention).
102 Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1232.
103 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
104 Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1233 (construing and quoting Fernandez v. United
States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (Harlan, Circuit Justice)(1961)).
105 Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1232 (citing Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662
(Douglas, Circuit Justice) (1962)).
106 See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
107 S. REP. No. 147, supra note 97, at 18.
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bility for his good conduct."108 The Committee stated that with the
decline of the surety system, Congress considered community safety
by making the most atrocious offenses, which were also capital of-
fenses, non-bailable. 109 The Committee concluded that when the
number of non-capital offenses increased and the Bail Reform Act
of 1966 prohibited consideration of dangerousness, judges contin-
ued to gauge the dangerousness of the defendant sub rosa by setting
high bail for serious felonies." 0 The Senate Committee argued
strongly, therefore, that preventive detention is compatible with
constitutional traditions because Congress has consistently exer-
cised, with court approval, its power to define bailable offenses.
A second argument, supporting Chief Judge Feinberg and re-
sponding to the Melendez and Salerno attack on" the use of prophylac-
tic measures, can be derived from the majority opinion in Schall.
Justice Rehnquist noted that preventive measures "[form] an impor-
tant element in many decisions" within the criminal justice sys-
tem."' These decisions include judicial evaluation of a death
sentence imposed by a jury, grants of parole, revocation of parole,
and the imposition of an increased sentence under the "dangerous
special offender" statute. 112
Commentators also support this view. While Professor Tribe
argued that pretrial detention contravenes our constitutional tradi-
tions, he conceded that "the desire to prevent future offenses obvi-
ously informs much of our law."' 1 3 In construing the Model Penal
Code, for example, Professor Tribe found a preventive purpose in
the substantive definitions of numerous crimes. 1 4 He also invoked
Blackstone's observation that "[i]f we consider all.., punishments
in a large and extended view, we shall find them all rather calculated
to prevent future crimes than to expiate the past.' "115
Third, as the Schall Court noted in the juvenile context, preven-
tive detention does not so readily "shock the conscience" if it is al-
ready widely used by the states.1 16 The Schall Court reasoned that
the fact that every state and the District of Columbia permit preven-
108 Id.
109 Id. at 19-20.
110 Id. at 20-21.
I 1 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79, n.30.
112 Id. The "dangerous special offender" statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3757
(1986).
113 Tribe, supra note 47, at 380 (footnote omitted).
114 Id. at 380 n.31 (construing MODEL PENAL CODE art. V, comment 24 (Tent. Draft
No. 10 (1960)).
115 Id. at 380 n.31 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *251-52).
116 Schall, 467 U.S. at 268.
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tive detention of juveniles should be given some weight in the due
process analysis of the New York juvenile detention law.' 17 While
adult preventive detention is not as pervasive as juvenile detention,
a comparative study of state law prepared for Congress found that
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia currently authorize
adult preventive detention. 18 Thus, as Justice Rehnquist noted in
Schall,
The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due
process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the
practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 19
Therefore, ChiefJudge Feinberg made a better reasoned argu-
ment regarding the constitutionality of BRA than the majority,
which asserted that preventive detention per se violates our consti-
tutional traditions. Chief Judge Feinberg's argument is better rea-
soned because of Congress's traditional power to define bailable
offenses, the importance of prophylactic measures during the pre-
trial period, and the practice of the states.
2. Is the Preventive Detention Authorized by BRA Excessive in Relation to
the Purpose of Fighting Pretrial Crime?
Having established that preventive detention under BRA does
not per se violate due process, the remaining question under the
Supreme Court's legislative purpose test is whether the particular
form of preventive detention authorized by BRA is excessive in rela-
tion to Congress' regulatory purpose. While only ChiefJudge Fein-
berg has addressed the question of whether preventive detention is
excessive because of the difficulties in predicting pretrial criminality
in the Second Circuit, 120 other courts in their due process analyses,
including the Supreme Court, have considered this problem. 121
117 Id.
I18 H.R. REP. No. 1121, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, 76 (1984) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1121 ] (quoting Public Danger as a Factor in Pretrial Release: The Pretrial Processing of "Danger-
ous" Defendants: A Comparative Analysis of State Laws) (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin).
119 Schall, 467 U.S. at 268 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934);
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)).
120 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 76 (Feinberg, CJ., dissenting).
121 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278 ("[A]pellees claim, and the District Court agreed, that it is
virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy.");
Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. at 506 ("The statutory provisions [of BRA] that rely on
future conduct are not speculative nor vague .... [T]here is nothing inherently unat-
tainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.' "); United States v. Edwards,
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Commentators have also addressed this issue.
a. The Argument Against Pretrial Detention.
Members of the Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, and commentators have argued that preventive deten-
tion is excessive in relation to the goal of fighting pretrial crime be-
cause of the difficulties of predicting who will commit crime while
out on bail.1 22 Justice Marshall in his dissent in Schall noted that
"no diagnostic tools" exist that would enable even "the most highly
trained criminologists" to reliably predict future criminal behav-
ior.1 23 In Edwards, Judge Mack of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals concurred with Justice Marshall's view. 124 Judge Mack re-
ferred to a study by the American Psychiatric Association which con-
cluded that even psychiatrists cannot accurately predict criminal
behavior. 125 He also noted a study published by the Harvard Journal
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties which concluded that in order to pre-
vent the commission of certain select offenses, authorities would
have to detain eight non-recidivists for every recidivist successfully
detained.' 26
Professor Ewing, commenting on this issue, argued that the ac-
curacy of crime prediction is higher than the Harvard study would
suggest, but still characterized the risk of error as unacceptable.127
He reviewed the potential for clinical predictions of criminal behav-
ior and concluded that the rate of false positives ranges from 54%
430 A.2d 1321, 1356 (D.C. 1981)(Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("In my view, the [District of Columbia preventive detention] statute cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny unless it contains ... additional safeguards which ... will make
the risk of error acceptably low.").
122 Schall, 467 U.S. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1369 (Fer-
ren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123 Schall, 467 U.S. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
124 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1369-70 (Mack, J., dissenting).
125 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1370 (construing American Psychiatric Association, Task Force
Report on the Clinical Aspects of Violent Individuals 28 (1974)).
126 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1370 n. 16 (construing Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 289 (1971)). The Harvard Study applied the criteria Con-
gress developed in the District of Columbia preventive detention statute which are in
part similar to the criteria in the present BRA. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1370 n.16.
127 For Ewing's evidence that preventive detention would erroneously detain ar-
restees 40% to 50% of the time, see infra note 128 and accompanying text. In compari-
son, the Harvard Study found that the system would erroneously detain arrestees 88%o
of the time. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Despite his suggestion of greater
accuracy, Professor Ewing does not favor preventive detention because "predictions of
criminal behavior in general ... are much more likely to be wrong than right." Ewing,
Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness Through the Looking Glass, 34 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 173, 196 (1985).
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to 65%.128 He also noted that these studies assumed that the per-
son predicting criminal behavior was a trained clinician or social sci-
entist who relied on "sophisticated multivariate analysis," not a
judge who is more likely to err by relying on other factors. 129 In-
deed, judges may often err on the side of detention because they
will thereby make "fewer demonstrable mistakes" and because it
will be difficult for them to distinguish between arrestees with simi-
lar criminal records and present indictments.' 30
Justice Marshall also reasoned in Schall that even ifjudges could
predict criminal behavior more accurately, the New York juvenile
detention statute 131 still violates due process because of the lack of
procedural safeguards for arrestees. 32 First, Justice Marshall noted
that the New York statute gives family court judges no guidance
about what kinds of evidence to consider in their decision to detain
a juvenile, such as "the nature of ajuvenile's criminal record or the
severity of the crime for which he was arrested."' 133 Second, the
statute does not establish a standard of proof prescribing how likely
it must be that the arrestee will commit a crime on bail.' 34 While
Justice Marshall did not suggest an appropriate standard of proof,
he referred to Addington v. Texas 135 where the Court held that "clear
and convincing proof [was] constitutionally required to justify civil
commitment to a mental hospital."' 136 Justice Marshall concluded
that the lack of guidance regarding evidence and standards of proof
"creates an excessive risk that juveniles will be detained
erroneously." 137
Even with the proper procedural safeguards, however, preven-
tive detention might still yield a high false positive rate.' 38 Studies
compiled by Professor Ewing have shown that limiting detention to
serious or violent crimes would result in a false positive rate "in the
50 to 60 percent range."' 139 Requiring a showing of probable cause
would produce false positive rates in approximately the same
128 Ewing, supra note 127, at 181-83. False positives are persons detained who would
not have committed crimes if released from custody. Ewing, supra note 127, at 181-83.
129 Ewing, supra note 127, at 199.
130 Tribe, supra note 47, at 382.
131 N.Y. [Family Court Act (26A)] § 320.5 (McKinney (1983)).
132 Schall, 467 U.S. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 302-03.
134 Id. at 303.
135 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
136 Schall, 467 U.S. at 303 n.32.
137 Id. at 303.
138 See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
139 Ewing, supra note 127, at 200-01.
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range. 140 Requiring a court to consider a series of factors such as
criminal history, prior multiple adjudications, and the present
charge of an "aggressive crime" would still "prove incorrect almost
50% of the time."1 4 1 Indeed, the rate of false positives may be very
difficult to reduce because "[c]riminal behavior, particularly violent
criminal behavior, is relatively rare .... It is generally agreed that
any predictions of rare behavior are bound to include a substantial
percentage of false positives.' "142
Thus, Justice Marshall, Judge Mack, and Professor Ewing have
persuasively argued that preventive detention is an inaccurate
method of fighting pretrial crime.
b. The Argument in Favor of Pretrial Detention
Despite the inaccuracies of preventive detention as demon-
strated by sociological data, preventive detention under BRA is con-
stitutionally acceptable for two reasons. First, preventive detention
under BRA is not excessive because it bears a "rational relation-
ship" to Congress's goal of preventing pretrial crime. 143 Second,
Congress has provided far better procedural safeguards in BRA
than were present in the New York juvenile detention statute.144
(i) The Rational Relationship Test
The courts in United States v. Hazzard145 and United States v.
Moore 146 developed a standard to determine whether a preventive
detention measure is "rationally related" to Congress' goal of re-
ducing pretrial crime. 147 In each case, the court analyzed BRA in
terms of the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's
due process clause and upheld the categories of presumptively dan-
gerous persons established in BRA.148
The Moore court concluded that since bail is not a fundamental
or constitutional right in all cases, the due process challenge should
be evaluated "under a rational basis' test."1 49 Under such a test, a
court must consider "whether it is conceivable that the classification
140 Id. at 201.
141 Id. at 205.
142 Id.
143 See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
145 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
146 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
147 Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 494-95; Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1452-53.
148 Id.
149 Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 494. See supra notes 99-100 regarding the constitutional
status of the right to be admitted to bail.
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bears a rational relationship to an end of government not prohibited
by the Constitution."' 5 0 The Hazzard court added that the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause
"does not require that Congress ... choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is enough
that Congress's action be rationally based .... ' 151 The Moore
court added that "[t]he court may not substitute its judgment for
that of Congress' so long as there is some reasonable basis for the
classification."1 52
To determine whether Congress had a rational basis for believ-
ing that the classifications under BRA would further its goal of
preventing pretrial crime, a brief re-examination of what triggers
detention under the statute is necessary. Under BRA, a finding of
probable cause that the defendant committed an offense carrying at
least a ten-year sentence, or an offense involving narcotics, violence,
or a firearm triggers a rebuttable presumption that no conditions of
release will assure community safety .'5 To determine whether the
defendant has rebutted this presumption of dangerousness, the
court considers, inter alia, the defendant's history of drug abuse, his
criminal history, and whether the offense involved a firearm. 154
Congress had a rational basis for believing that individuals fall-
ing into these classifications were likely to commit crimes while on
bail. First, the Moore court concluded that drug offenders could con-
stitutionally be detained because Congress "articulated a reasonable
basis" for detaining certain drug offenders. 155 The court noted that
the legislative history of BRA "contains a lengthy discourse on the
reasons Congress believed drug offenders constituted danger to the
community." 156 The Senate Judiciary committee reported that
drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged
in continuing patterns of criminal activity. Persons charged with major
drug felonies are often in the business of importing or distributing
dangerous drugs, and thus, because of the nature of the criminal activ-
ity with which they are charged, they pose a significant risk of pretrial
recidivism. 157
150 Id. (quoting J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591 (2d
ed. 1983)).
151 Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1452. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-
87 (1970)).
152 Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 494-95.
153 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(1) (1985).
154 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)(2).
155 Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 495.
156 Id.
157 S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 49, at 20. See also Bail Reform, 1981: Hearings on S. 440,
S. 482, S. 1253, S. 1554 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary
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Second, the Senate had evidence that arrestees with prior crimi-
nal records were more likely to be re-arrested while out on bail than
other arrestees. The Senate based its conclusion upon ajustice De-
partment study,158 the testimony of one Senator noting that 36% of
repeat offenders arrested were on some form of bail for previous
crimes,' 59 and the testimony of the National District Attorney's As-
sociation showing that 34% of the repeat offenders released in a test
project committed crimes while on bail.' 60 On the basis of these
findings, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that
a history of pretrial criminality is, absent mitigating information, a ra-
tional basis for concluding that a defendant poses a significant threat
to community safety and that he cannot be trusted to conform to the
requirements of the law while on release.' 6 '
Professor Ewing has also in his writings noted that "the single most
potent predictor of future crime is past crime, particularly violent
crime."1 62
Third, Congress relied on studies showing a high pretrial recid-
ivism rate for those who committed crimes with firearms. For exam-
ple, the Judiciary Committee reviewed one study which concluded
that 34.6% of those arrested for armed robbery were subsequently
indicted for another felony while on bail, and that of those indicted,
the average recidivist committed 1.7 crimes while on release. 163
In addition, there are two more general reasons which support
Congress's choice of preventive detention as a means of fighting
pretrial crime. First, Congress found that general rates of pretrial
recidivism, as well as recidivism rates for selected crimes, were very
high and on the increase.' 64 For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that one-third of all those arrested in the District
of Columbia were on some form of conditional release and that one
out of five was on some form of pretrial release. 65 The Committee
also relied on a study showing that in the District of Columbia 28%
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-60. [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement and testi-
mony of Sen. Chiles)(Congress considered testimony of a Senator from a state with a
high number of drug arrests in coming to its conclusion that drug offenders are likely to
pose dangers to the community).
158 S. REP. No. 147, supra note 97, at 27 (citing NAT'L INST. OF L. ENFORCEMENT AND
GRIM. JUST. L. ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Instead ofJail:
Pre and Post-Trial Alternatives to Jail Incarceration (1977)).
159 S. Rep. No. 157, supra note 97, at 79 (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
160 Id. at 105 (testimony ofJames Anders, National Association of District Attorneys).
161 S. Rep. No. 147, supra note 97, at 45-46.
162 Ewing, supra note 127, at 199-200.
163 S. Rep. No. 147, supra note 97, at 24.
164 See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
165 S. Rep. No. 147, supra note 97, at 27.
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of the murders, 19% of the rapes, 31% of the robberies, 32% of the
burglaries, and 11% of the assaults were commited by persons on
some form of conditional release.' 66 In all, the study found that
slightly over one-fourth of all felonies were committed by persons
on pretrial release.1 67 Other studies reviewed by the Committee
placed the general recidivism rate as high as 63% 168 and the specific
recidivism rate for certain arrestees, such as those arrested for auto
theft, at 65%. 169 The Committee also cited a study which concluded
that pretrial crime was increasing in 52% of the seventy-two cities
and towns surveyed.t 70
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the prediction that an
arrestee will commit a crime while out on bail may well be as accu-
rate, if not more accurate, than other predictions of future criminal-
ity made in the criminal justice system. Professor Monohan has
argued that preventive detention predictions are reasonably accu-
rate in comparison to other predictions made by criminologists and
are more accurate than false positive statistics would suggest:
[A]fter years of carefully examining these studies [of pretrial recidi-
vism predictions] in light of other criminological research, Monohan
has concluded that these studies "provide reasonably accurate estimates
... of violence." Monohan's conclusion is based in large measure
upon other criminological data which "support the argument that the
one third of the individuals who are predicted as violent and are ar-
rested for a violent crime are in fact the same people who commit most
of the unreported crime and unsolved criminal acts .... It is not that
the false positives are really true positives in disguise but rather that
the true positives are truer (i.e., more violent) than we had
imagined." 17'
Former Attorney General Mitchell agreed with Professor Monohan.
He argued that there are certain "dangerous federal crimes" includ-
ing "robbery, burglary, arson, rape, sex crimes, and unlawful drug
sales" which
usually result from a continuing motivation of pecuniary profit or sex-
ual gratification, which involve planning, deliberation and the pur-
poseful selection of a victim .... Moreover . . . these dangerous
crimes frequently involve cooperation with other criminals on a con-
tinuing basis. The nature of these offenses, the fact that the arrest rate






171 Ewing, supra note 127, at 186 (quoting and construing Monohan, The Prediction of




enforcement officers with such offenders, compels the conclusion that
a person charged with commission of one of these crimes is rarely ap-
prehended on his first criminal venture.1 7 2
Thus, Congress had a "rational basis" for believing that BRA
would promote the goal of reducing pretrial crime. The data Con-
gress reviewed supports the argument that certain classes of defend-
ants are more likely to commit crime while out on bail than others
and demonstrates that Congress tailored BRA to detain only these
arrestees. Furthermore, Monohan's and Mitchell's findings regard-
ing the relative accuracy of preventive detention counter the com-
peting sociological data which suggests that preventive detention is
excessive in relation to Congress' purpose. The evidence presented
by Monohan and Mitchell shows that in comparison to other predic-
tive efforts in criminology, pretrial detention predictions are reason-
ably accurate, particularly in light of their propensity to detect and
detain previously undetected repeat offenders. Therefore, preven-
tive detention arguably is not excessive in relation to the goal of
reducing pretrial crime.
Unlike the New York juvenile detention statute which Justice
Marshall criticized in Schall, BRA provides guidance to judges as to
what factors to consider in detaining adults. In fact, BRA requires a
judge to examine the arrestee's prior criminal record and the sever-
ity of his present offense, considerations which were suggested by
Justice Marshall in Schall.173 The legislative history, moreover, pro-
vides a rational basis for believing that these factors, as well as the
others enumerated in BRA, should form the basis of detention
decisions.
(ii) Procedural Safeguards Under BRA
The remaining question is whether BRA meets Justice Mar-
shall's second objection that preventive detention lacks the proce-
dural safeguards necessary to reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivations of liberty.' 7 4 The procedures required by BRA do
meet the Supreme Court's procedural due process standards and
are responsive to Justice Marshall's criticism of the New York juve-
nile detention statute in Schall.
The Supreme Court set out the procedural due process stan-
dards for preventive detention in Schall.175 The Court reasoned in
172 Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1236 (footnote omitted).
173 Schall, 407 U.S. at 302-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 303.




Schall that "a judicial determination of probable cause" is required
before the state may restrain an individual's liberty for an extended
period of time.' 76 Justice Rehnquist stated, however, that "a spe-
cific timetable" is not required and that the accused is not entitled
to "the full panoply of adversary safeguards' " including cross-ex-
amination, the rights of counsel and confrontation, and compulsory
process of the witnesses. 177 The Schall Court noted the desirability
of "flexibility and informality while ... ensuring adequate . . . safe-
guards" in pretrial detention procedures. 178
BRA meets and exceeds the procedural standards enunciated in
Schall. As the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Portes,179
under BRA the court must hold the detention hearing immediately
upon the defendant's initial appearance, continuances are strictly
limited to five days, and the defendant has the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, to call witnesses, to testify himself, and to cross-
examine other witnesses.180 Thus, the Portes court joined a number
of other courts in holding that "these procedures adequately protect
the liberty interest" of the accused. 18 ' In addition, BRA requires
that a judge state in writing his reasons for detention, 8 2 that he
support these reasons with "clear and convincing evidence,"' 1 3 and
that the courts of appeal conduct an expedited review of all deten-
tion orders. 84
BRA's procedural standards also respond to Justice Marshall's
criticisms of the New York juvenile detention statute. Under BRA,
the standard of proof of "clear and convincing evidence" governs a
judge's determination of detention. The Supreme Court used the
same clear and convincing evidence standard in Addington v. Texas,' 8 5
a case which Justice Marshall referred to in his critique of the New
York statute in Schall.186
Thus, in comparison to the New York juvenile detention statute
upheld in Schall, which provided no guidance to a judge regarding
the criteria or kinds of evidence to consider in detaining a juvenile
176 Id. at 274-75.
177 Id. at 275.
178 Id.
179 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1986).
180 Id. at 767 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f)).
181 Id. at 767-68; Accord Delker, 757 F.2d at 1397;Jessup, 757 F.2d at 385; Freilas, 602 F.
Supp. at 1292; Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1453-54.
182 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (i).
183 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f).
184 18 U.S.C. § 3145.
185 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
186 Schall, 467 U.S. at 303 n.32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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arrestee, i8 7 the procedural safeguards in BRA do not create "an ex-
cessive risk that [persons] ... will be detained erroneously.' "188 In
fact, BRA "minimizes the risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty
through extensive procedural provisions." '1 8 9
C. SUMMARY.
Therefore, despite the strong arguments that preventive deten-
tion is inaccurate in predicting criminal behavior and is excessive in
relation to its purpose, BRA meets the Supreme Court's three part
legislative purpose test enunciated in Bell and Schall. First, Congress
did not intend to punish arrestees in BRA. Second, Congress
sought only to detain arrestees in order to regulate their future con-
duct.' 90 Third, Congress' regulation is not excessive in relation to
its purpose. Preventive confinement prior to a final determination
of guilt does not violate our constitutional traditions.19 1 In addi-
tion, Congress has reasonably tailored BRA so that only those ar-
restees who are most likely to commit crimes on bail will be
detained. 192 Congress also provided procedural safeguards in BRA
to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty. 193 Indeed,
in his analysis of Schall, Professor Ewing concluded that the
Supreme Court would uphold preventive detention for adults.' 9 4
The constitutionality of BRA should not, however, be deter-
mined on the basis of the legislative purpose test alone for two rea-
sons. First, the legislative purpose test does not enable courts to
mitigate the harsh effect of excessive detention caused by the diffi-
culties of predicting pretrial criminal behavior. Despite Congress'
thorough consideration of which criteria to use to identify which de-
fendants to detain and Professor Monohan's observations concern-
ing the relative reliability of predictions of criminal behavior,1 95
judges will still be likely to detain large numbers of arrestees errone-
ously.' 96 Sociological data suggests, moreover, that procedural
safeguards will not significantly reduce the number of erroneous de-
187 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
188 Schall, 467 U.S. at 303 n.32 (paraphrasing Justice Marshall).
189 Note, Pretrial Preventive Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 63 WASH. U.L.Q.
523, 543 (1985) (arguing that BRA is constitutional under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment) (footnotes omitted).
190 See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
194 Ewing, supra note 127, at 216-19.
195 See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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tentions. 197 Second, the present legislative purpose test, as Justice
Marshall noted in Bell, does not consider the potential punitive effect
of pretrial detention on arrestees. 198
V. A FOURTH FACTOR: THE LENGTH OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
Chief Judge Feinberg's opinions in Melendez and Salerno more
thoroughly analyzed the due process issue than did the Supreme
Court in Schall in his suggestion that the length of pretrial detention
should also be considered. Considering the length of pretrial de-
tention would allow courts to better monitor whether preventive de-
tention has become excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose in
a particular case. While consideration of the length of pretrial de-
tention is not aimed at increasing the accuracy of predictions of pre-
trial recidivism, adding this fourth consideration to the due process
analysis would allow judges to mitigate the harsh effects of the false
positive problem by ensuring that arrestees are detained for only
short periods of time whenever possible. Consideration of the
length of pretrial detention would also enable courts to gauge the
potential punitive effect of detention on arrestees.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Columbo 1 99 determined
that "Congress relied upon the Speedy Trial Act . .. to limit the
length of pretrial incarceration" under BRA. 200 The Columbo court
noted that the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected attempts by
Senators to impose a sixty day ceiling on all detentions as provided
in the District of Columbia detention statute.201 The Columbo court
relied on the following portion of the Committee's report:
18 U.S.C. § 3161 [of the Speedy Trial Act] specifically requires that
priority be given to a case in which a defendant is detained, and also
requires that his trial must, in any event, occur within 90 days ....
These current limitations are sufficient to assure that a person is not
detained pending trial for an extended period of time.20 2
The Columbo court concluded, nonetheless, that BRA in practice,
particularly in complex cases, "might not work perfectly well to pro-
tect against lengthy incarceration.- 20 3
197 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
199 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
200 Id. at 100. Congress did not impose a limitation on the length of pretrial deten-
tion in BRA itself. Instead, Congress provided that the provisions of the Speedy Trial
Act would apply to ensure that all detainees came to trial within 90 days. Id. See supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
201 Cohwmbo, 777 F.2d at 100.
202 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 225, supra note 49, at 22 n.63 (1984)).
203 Id. at 10 1. The court in Cohinmbo, however, was faced with the issue of whether a
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Recent cases have demonstrated that BRA has resulted in very
lengthy pretrial detention, particularly in multi-count, multi-defend-
ant cases. 204 Two examples illustrate the problem of lengthy deten-
tion. In United States v. Melendez-Carrion,20 5 two defendants were
indicted with fifteen others for bank robbery.20 6 The government
maintained in Melendez that the number of defendants and the large
amount of time necessary to transcribe hundreds of tapes made of
intercepted conversations in Spanish would delay trial until mid-
1987, causing the arrestees to be detained for a total of two to three
years. 20 7 The court ruled that the preventive detention of eight
months which had already occurred was unconstitutional. 20 8
In United States v. Zannino,20 9 the defendant, Ilario Zannino, was
indicted with six 'co-defendants in a multi-count indictment which
charged him with loansharking, gambling, and racketeering viola-
tions, predicate acts of two murders, and four counts of conspiracy
to murder.210 Though the defendant had already been detained for
sixteen months and had suffered a cardiac arrest two months after
he was detained, the First Circuit ruled that further detention was
permissible. 2' I
While a detention of sixteen months is rare, detention exceed-
ing the ninety day provision of BRA is not. Recent statistics show
that "307 defendants were detained in custody 151 days and over"
prior to the disposition of the charges pending against them.21 2
ChiefJudge Feinberg argued persuasively against the constitu-
tionality of such extended detention in Melendez. ChiefJudge Fein-
berg asserted, drawing on a factor of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez213 test which was omitted by the Supreme Court in Schall,
that "incarceration for periods as long as eight months has histori-
district court judge could order the detainee released under BRA "based on the specula-
tive anticipated length of his pretrial incarceration." Id. The court held that such a
speculative release was an abuse of the district court's discretion. Id.
204 See Columbo, 777 F.2d at 101 (speculating that multi-count, multi-defendant cases
might yield lengthy pretrial incarcerations under BRA).
205 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986).
206 Id. at 988.
207 Id. at 1006 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
208 Id. at 1000.
209 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986). The court in Zannino adopted without further elabo-
ration the substantive due process reasoning expressed by ChiefJudge Feinberg of the
Second Circuit. Id. at 546.
210 Id. at 545.
211 Id. at 547-9. See infra notes 242-46 and accompanying text for the basis of the
court's decision to continue detention of Zannino.
212 Accelluro, 783 F.2d at 395 (Sloviter, J., dissenting in part).
213 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). See supra note 23 for a discussion of M1endoza.
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cally been regarded as punishment.' ",214 He stated "[s]ince none of
the traditionally regulatory' reasons for jailing a person without
trial, such as the defendant's propensity to flee or to tamper with
witnesses, justify confinement in such a case [for eight months],
such lengthy detention would historically be seen as a punish-
ment. '"215 Chief Judge Feinberg also reasoned that incarceration
may be "rendered so harsh by its length that it... degenerates into
punishment." 21 6 He stated that "[e]nforced separation from family,
friends, and the community by confinement in an institutional set-
ting for many months is clearly punitive under our traditions. ' 2 1 7
Other courts have also recognized that lengthy pretrial deten-
tion exceeding the ninety day provision in BRA raises serious due
process questions under the fifth amendment.218 As Chief Judge
Feinberg has noted, "[e]very other appellate court that has ex-
amined the lawfulness of this practice under the Bail Reform Act has
indicated that pretrial detention to prevent future crimes may be
invalid if unduly prolonged." 2 19 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Theron 220 concluded that detention for four months was too
lengthy and thus unconstitutional. 22 1 The District Court for the
Northern District of California in United States v. Freitas222 upheld
BRA as constitutional while emphasizing that detention under BRA
is strictly limited in time. 223 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Schall
noted, with regard to the New York juvenile detention law, that
"[t]here is no indication in the statute itself that preventive deten-
tion is used.., as a punishment. First of all, the detention is strictly
limited in time." 224
Moreover, Congress did not intend that detention would nor-
mally exceed the ninety day limit provided in BRA. Several Sena-
tors even attempted to limit all detention under BRA to sixty days as
is the limit under the District of Columbia preventive detention stat-
214 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1008 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring)(citing Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1008. (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
217 Id.
218 See in/ra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
219 Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 78 (Feinberg, G.J., dissenting)(citing Portes, 786 F.2d at 768
n.14). Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388; United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1986); Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1333.
220 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir. 1986).
221 Id. at 1516.
222 602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
223 Id. at 1291.
224 Schall, 467 U.S. at 269.
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ute.225 Three members of the Judiciary Committee, in persuading
the Senate not to adopt a sixty day ceiling, argued that the ninety
day limit would not be exceeded. The Committee Chairman, Sena-
tor Thurmond, emphasized that "the 90 days [provision] is the
worst case limit," while Senator Laxalt referred to it as the "upper
bound." 226 Senator Grassley concurred, arguing that under the
BRA as written "no defendant will be detained indefinitely while the
processes of justice grind to a halt." 227
Chief Judge Feinberg concluded that the problem of lengthy
detention is best resolved on a case-by-case analysis by the
courts. 228 The courts, according to Chief Judge Feinberg, must
strive to determine whether preventive detention has become puni-
tive in its effect because of its length.229
Considerable opposition exists within the Second Circuit to
Chief Judge Feinberg's view. First, in his Melendez dissent, Judge
Timbers reasoned that while the liberty restraint imposed on the
arrestee by detention increases with time, "[c]ongressional intent
and the importance of preventing reasonably predictable future
criminal conduct do not change with the passage of time. ' 2 0 Judge
Timbers' criticism of Chief Judge Feinberg's consideration of the
length of pretrial detention emphasizes the need for a fourth crite-
rion in the constitutional test. Indeed, the three factor Bell test ap-
plied by Judge Timbers in Melendez cannot take into account the
potential punitive effect of detention extending beyond what BRA's
sponser called the "worst case limit" of ninety days. 23' Second,
Judge Newman in Melendez would declare pretrial detention uncon-
stitutional in all cases. 23 2 However, his approach is too extreme be-
cause it would prohibit even brief detentions of particularly
dangerous defendants such as Zannino. 233
Scrutinizing the length of detention on a case-by-case basis is
advantageous when compared to both Judge Timbers' and Judge
Newman's approach because of its flexibility. A case-by-case analy-
225 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 996 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring).
226 Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S941, 943 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984)(statements of Sen-
ators Thurmond and Laxalt)).
227 Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S945 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984)(statement of Senator
Grassley)).
228 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 78-9 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
229 Id.
230 Melendez, 792 F.2d at 1014 (Timbers, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
231 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
232 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1005 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring) ("Judge Newman's opinion
*.. would bar the pretrial detention for even a brief period of time of a competent adult
criminal defendant on the basis of danger to the community.").
233 See Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1005 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring).
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sis would enable the government to detain briefly particularly dan-
gerous defendants, yet still allow judicial review of the potential
punitive effect of pretrial detention. Three appellate courts have
declined to draw "bright lines" as to when persons detained on the
basis of dangerousness should be released. 234 As the Third Circuit
explained in United States v. Accetturo235
Because due process is a flexible concept, arbitrary lines should not be
drawn regarding precisely when defendants adjudged to be flight risks
or dangers to the community should be released pending trial. In-
stead, we believe that due process judgments should be made on the
facts of individual cases. 236
Moreover, while Congress did not want detentions to run for long
periods of time, not even the proponents of a sixty day limit on de-
tention desired an absolute ceiling on the length of detention in all
cases.
237
Many authorities have suggested that the length of pretrial de-
tention factor of the due process test be applied using the following
criteria: the length of the detention which has already occurred, the
complexity of the federal government's case against the detainee,
and whether one side has added to the complexity of the case need-
lessly or delayed the case without good cause. 238 In addition, the
Accetturo and Zannino courts suggested that courts consider the seri-
ousness of the pending charges, the strength of the proof that the
defendant will pose a danger to the community, and the strength of
the government's evidence on the underlying charges. 239
Both Melendez and Zannino provide good illustrations of how the
length of pretrial detention could be incorporated as a fourth factor
in the due process analysis. In Melendez, Judge Feinberg apparently
found no additional evidence relating to either the length of deten-
tion or whether one side had contributed needlessly to the complex-
ity of the case because he concluded that the defendants "face
continued incarceration solely on the basis of their anticipated pro-
pensity to commit future crimes." 240 The "anticipated propensity"
to commit crime on bail, without more, was insufficient to merit con-
234 Id. at 1008 (Feinberg, CJ., concurring); Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388; Theron, 782 F.2d
at 1516.
235 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
236 Id. at 388.
237 Melendez, 790 F.2d at 996 (citing 130 CONG. REc. S941, 945)(statements of Sena-
tors Specter and Mitchell); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 49, at 22 n.63).
238 See Salerno, 794 F.2d at 79; Accelturo, 783 F.2d at 388; Zannino, 798 F.2d at 547.
239 Zannino, 798 F.2d at 547 (quoting Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388).
240 See Melendez, 790 F.2d at 1009 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring)(emphasis added).
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tinued detention in Melendez. 24 1
In Zannino, the court adduced evidence to justify an extended
detention. First, the court assessed the seriousness of the charges
against the defendant and found that they were of the "gravest or-
der," involving predicate acts of two murders and carrying a maxi-
mum 130 year prison sentence. 242 Second, the court assessed the
strength of the government's allegation that the defendant posed a
threat of danger to the community if released. The court concluded
that the defendant had the potential to play "a continuing leader-
ship role in mob activities" to which he had "devoted his life" de-
spite his health condition. 243 Third, the court found that the trial
had been delayed at Zannino's insistence and that the government
had "steadfastly pressed for trial throughout the period of Zan-
nino's detention. ' 244 On the basis of these findings, the court con-
cluded that while 16 months of detention may well prove to be
excessive in most cases, continuing detention given these circum-
stances did not violate due process. 245 The court emphasized that a
rigid limitation on the length of pretrial detention would eviscerate
the government's regulatory purpose in BRA:
[C]ourts often would be forced by the duration of detention alone to
release a palpably dangerous defendant, or a defendant palpably likely
to flee or intimidate witnesses .... Such a result would virtually scut-
tle the important governmental purposes promoted by the Bail Re-
form Act's pretrial detention provisions. 246
Chief Judge Feinberg's opinions in Melendez and Salerno thus
agrue for the adoption of an additional element of the due process
test: the length of pretrial detention. There are many advantages to
the approach which Chief Judge Feinberg suggests. A case-by-case
analysis enables the government to legitimately pursue its goals by
detaining particularly dangerous defendants for the statutory period
of ninety days, while also enabling courts to gauge the potential pu-
nitive effect of pretrial detention on arrestees. 247
The development of the length of pretrial detention as a fourth
241 Id.
242 Zannino, 798 F.2d at 547.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 548.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 One disadvantage of a case-by-case approach to the due process analysis is poten-
tial inconsistency of application among the circuits. However, due process is amenable
to such variations because of its flexible response to different fact situations. Freitas, 602
F. Supp. at 1291 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)("It is well
established that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.' ").
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factor in the due process analysis is advantageous for three other
reasons related to the separation of powers between the branches of
the federal government. First, a more active judicial role in policing
the potential punitive effect of detention will become very important
"[b]ecause the defendants whose liberties are most affected are
those who are unlikely to command public sympathy or attention
[and therefore] it is unlikely there will be action from Congress" to
improve BRA.248 Second, if the courts adopt a "policing" role, they
can force the federal government either to accelerate its trial prepa-
ration prior to indictment or be foreclosed from using pretrial de-
tention. 249 Third, it is important that lower federal courts take on
the policing role which the fourth factor provides because the
Supreme Court will not allow them to strike down preventive deten-
tion statutes on the grounds that sociological data show that they
constitute poor public policy. 250 The Schall court noted, "we have
specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of socio-
logical data relied on by appellees and the district court, that it is
impossible to predict future behavior and [we feel] ... that the ques-
tion is so vague as to be meaningless."-25 1 The Schall Court also
said, in response to the dissent:
The dissent would apparently have us strike down New York's preven-
tive detention statute on two grounds: first, because the preventive de-
tention of juveniles constitutes poor public policy ...and, second,
because the statute could have been better drafted to improve the
quality of the decision making process .... But it is worth recalling
that we are neither a legislature charged with formulating public policy
nor an American Bar Association committee charged with drafting a
model statute. The question before us today is solely whether the pre-
ventive detention system chosen by the State of New York ... com-
ports with constitutional standards. 252
Therefore, adding the length of pretrial detention as a fourth
factor to the due process test would greatly improve the quality of
the constitutional analysis of preventive detention. Given the reluc-
tance of the Supreme Court to allow lower courts to invalidate pre-
ventive detention on the basis of sociological data, a four factor test
comprised of the three Bell factors and the length of pretrial deten-
tion would provide a more thorough constitutional analysis of cases
involving preventive detention under BRA. The most significant
advantage of considering the length of pretrial detention is that it
248 Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 395-96 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
249 Salerno, 794 F.2d at 79 n.2 (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting).
250 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 281.
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would enable courts to mitigate the harsh effects of the false positive
problem and to gauge the potential punitive effect of pretrial
detention.
While adding the length of pretrial detention to the due process
analysis will help mitigate the problems of preventive detention,
there is evidence in the legislative history of BRA that less constitu-
tionally suspect, yet more effective means to fight crime on bail are
available. 253 The next segment of this Comment suggests that while
there is a rational relationship between certain categories of ar-
restees and the goals of BRA, the use of pretrial services, speedier
trials, and detention upon commission of a crime while out on bail
provide more effective, yet less constitutionally suspect means of
fighting pretrial crime.
VI. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Congress' effort to limit detention to dangerous offenders hav-
ing high pretrial recidivism rates eliminates only some of the criti-
cisms of preventive detention. Even with the most favorable
procedural due process protections, the false positive rate never
falls below fifty percent.254 Moreover, Congress knew about the
false positive problem. Representative Kastenmeier referred explic-
itly to the studies relating to the false positive problem and con-
cluded that BRA "makes it likely that the courts will lock up far too
many to ensure that they have detained the dangerous few."' 255
Congress also knew that preventive detention might actually ex-
acerbate the problem of pretrial crime.256 Representative Kas-
tenmeier pointed out that preventive detention hearings are
elaborate and time consuming. 257 The more detention hearings
that are held, the longer the delays will be in holding trials for the
larger number of arrestees who have been released prior to trial. 258
253 See infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
255 H.R. Rep. No. 1121, supra note 118, at 59, 60 (additional views of Representative
Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice). Moreover, during the hearings on BRA, the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts informed Congress that by using the present charge
and prior criminal record as factors in detaining arrestees, 22% of those detained have
not even committed the underlying offense. Bail Reform Act 1981-2: Hearings Before The
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. 86 [hereinafter House Hearings] (Testimony of Guy
Willets, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
256 See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.





The longer the delays between arrest and trial for those released,
the greater the probability that they will commit crime on bail. 259
Preventive detention also creates added expenses as a result of the
need to build and maintain additional prison facilities. 260 Finally,
pretrial detention may actually increase the recidivist tendencies of
detainees once they are released. 26' As one study presented to Con-
gress found:
In many respects, persons detained in jail prior to trial are subjected to
even worse conditions with less chance for rehabilitation .... The
indelible impact of this incarceration, the exposure to those whose way
of life is crime and to persons who have lost all hope and are resigned
to failure, leave many defendants hardened, embittered, and more
likely to recidivate once released, than they were before
incarceration. 262
Professor Tribe has argued that the greatest weakness of pre-
ventive detention is Congress' inability to monitor the success and
accuracy of such a program. Pressures to detain more arrestees will
grow as a result. Tribe persuasively summarized the argument by
stating:
Once the government has instituted a system of imprisonment openly
calculated to prevent crimes committed by persons awaiting trial, the
system will appear to be malfunctioning only when it releases persons
who prove to be worse risks than anticipated. The pretrial misconduct
of these persons will seem to validate, and will indeed augment, the
fear and insecurity that the system is calculated to appease. But when
the system detains persons who could safely have been released, its
errors will be invisible. Since no detained defendant will commit a
public offense, each decision to detain fulfills the prophesy that is
thought to warrant it, while any decision to release may be refuted by
its results.
The inevitable consequence is a continuing pressure to broaden
the system in order to reach ever more potential detainees. Indeed,
this pressure will be generated by the same fears which made preven-
tive detention seem attractive in the first place.2 63
Congress had evidence of the pitfalls of preventive detention
when it enacted BRA. In addition, it had evidence of far more effec-
tive means of reducing pretrial crime including pretrial services,
speedier trials, and detention upon the commission of a crime while
out on bail.
259 House Hearings, supra note 255, at 204-05 (testimony of Ira Glasser, American Civil
Liberties Union).
260 Id. at 204.
261 Id. at 205 (quoting Angel, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted)).
262 Id.




Pretrial service officers collect and verify information regarding
arrestees, recommend release conditions, modify and review these
recommendations as necessary, supervise persons on release, and
inform the court of any violations of the release conditions.2 64 Pre-
trial services greatly reduce the incidence of crime on bail.265 A five
year federal pilot project in ten demonstration districts found that
though 90% of the arrestees were released, pretrial crime was cut in
half.266 Pretrial services succeed because for the first time, court of-
ficials have verified information on which to make release deci-
sions.267 Senator Biden has noted that pretrial services, though
costly, will result in a savings to the community in terms of reduc-
tions in crime on bail, unnecessary detentions, and fugitive rates. 268
Thus, in comparison to preventive detention, Pretrial services re-
duce pretrial crime more efficiently.269
B. SPEEDIER TRIALS
Studies published by the Harvard Journal of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties and the Commerce Department have shown that the longer
a person classified as dangerous is on release, the greater the
probability that he will be re-arrested for another crime.2 70 One
commenator has asserted that if the Speedy Trial Act is fully imple-
mented, pretrial crime would be reduced by 50%.271
These empirical findings comport with judicial experience. 272
Judge George L. Hart noted that if trials could be held "within 6
weeks to two months of the arrest," there would be no need to
amend the previous Bail Reform Act.2 73 Judge Harold Greene
264 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 365-66 (statement of Senator Biden).
265 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
266 House Hearings, supra note 255, at 85-86 (testimony of Guy Willets, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts).
267 Id. at 86.
268 Senate Hearings, supra note 157, at 367 (statement of Senator Biden).
269 Compare supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text, regarding the expenses cre-
ated by preventive detention, with supra note 268 and accompanying text, regarding the
savings to the community by using pretrial services.
270 House Hearings, supra note 255, at 206 (testimony of Ira Glasser, A.C.L.U.) (citing
Angel, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 317, 360;
Locke, Compilation and Use of Criminal Court Data in Relation to Pre-Trial Release of Defendants:
Pilot Study, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Standards, U.S. DEP'T OF COM. 165 (1970)).
271 Id. at 207 (testimony of Ira Glasser, A.C.L.U.)(citing Duke, Bail Reform for the Eight-
ies: A Reply to Senator Kennedy, 49 FORDUAM L. REV., 40, 46 n.40 (1980)).
272 See infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
273 House Hearings, supra note 255, at 207 (testimony of Ira Glasser, A.C.L.U.) (quoting
Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
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agreed, noting that if trials were held quickly the problem of crime
on bail would be greatly diminished because "many crimes are com-
mitted in the first 45 to 60 days" after arrest.274 Judge Green also
noted that "the mere fact that a speedy trial is available would be a
much greater deterrent to crime than what we have now, when it
takes a year to a year and a half to have a criminal case tried in the
district court. 275
C. CONSIDERATION OF DANGEROUSNESS AND LIMITED DETENTION
Judges should be permitted to consider the dangerousness of
the defendant in setting the conditions of release and in allowing
pretrial detention when the defendant commits a crime while out on
bail. Allowing a judge to consider the dangerousness of the defend-
ant given his prior record is a prerequisite to effective pretrial serv-
ices. Consideration of the dangerousness of the defendant would
allow judges to devise effective release conditions and to revoke bail
if necessary to reduce the likelihood of further criminality before
trial.2 76 Similarly, Congress also noted the need to allow judges to
consider the dangerousness of defendants in making release
decisions. 277
In addition, the commission of a crime while out on bail should
trigger pretrial detention. Pretrial detention would thus be based
on a present manifestation of dangerousness, not a prediction of
future dangerousness. This approach would avoid the false positive
problem because reliance would not be placed on future predictions
of criminality. Detention triggered by crime on bail, moreover,
would give strength to the conditions of release by requiring a swift
judicial reprisal for any breach of the release conditions. 278 These
swift judicial reprisals would also act as a visible deterrent to crime
on bail.2 79
Finally, if an arrestee commits a crime on release, the federal
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1969)[hereinafter Amend-
ment Hearings](Testimony ofJudge George L. Hart).
274 Amendment Hearings, supra note 273, at 10-11 (quoting Amendment Hearings, supra
note 255, at 41 (testimony of Judge Harold Greene)).
275 Id.
276 Such a proposal has the support of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. House Hearings, supra note 255, at 84 (statement of
Judge Gerald Tjoflat, Criminal Law Committee, Judicial Conference of the United
States).
277 S. Rep. No. 147, supra note 97, at 1-2 (1983).
278 Id.
279 See Id. at 136-39. This type of proposal is supported by the Committee on Crimi-
nal Justice Standards of the American Bar Association, Id., and also has some Congres-
sional support. H.R. REP. No. 1121, supra note 118, at 25 (similar proposal, made by
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government should be required to submit clear and convincing evi-
dence of the underlying charge and to meet all other BRA require-
ments. The requirements would include demonstrating a history of
alcohol or drug abuse and a previous criminal record. By making it
more difficult to secure detention, this high standard of review
would help ensure that police agencies do not re-arrest individuals
simply because they wish to incarcerate them.
In summary, pretrial services, speedier trials, and detention
triggered by crime on bail have proven effective in reducing pretrial
crime,28 0 whereas preventive detention may be inacurrate in pre-
dicting who will commit crime while out on bail. 28 ' Each element in
the proposal imposes fewer physical restraints on the arrestee prior
to trial than incarceration, thereby raising fewer constitutional
problems. Similarly, when detention does occur, it would be based
upon a present manifestation of dangerousness, not a potentially
unreliable general prediction. In addition, the three elements of
this proposal have the support of various groups with special exper-
tise in criminal law. 28 2 Thus, pretrial services, speedier trials, and
detention triggered by crime on bail would constitute a more effec-
tive, and less constitutionally suspect means of fighting pretrial
crime than preventive detention under BRA. Unlike preventive de-
tention under BRA, this three element proposal would effectively
reduce pretrial crime without reliance on inaccurate and constitu-
tionally suspect predictions of future criminality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress changed federal bail policy in the Bail Reform Act of
1984 by enabling judicial officers to detain an arrestee because he is
likely to commit a crime while out on bail. While the Bail Reform
Act fulfills the requirements of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment under the Bell Court's three-part legislative purpose
test, BRA poses difficult constitutional questions given the problem
of accurately predicting who will commit crime on bail.
ChiefJudge Feinberg's opinions in Melendez and Salerno provide
a more thorough due process inquiry by suggesting that the length
of pretrial detention be an added consideration. Considering the
length of pretrial detention as a fourth factor in the due process
analysis will mitigate the harsh effects of inaccurate preventive de-
Representative Kastenmeier, defeated in the HouseJudiciary Committee by a vote of 13
to 18).
280 See supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
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tention and enable judges to gauge the potential punitive effects of
preventive detention under BRA.
Despite the present potential for an enhanced constitutional
analysis provided by the consideration of the length of pretrial de-
tention, the ultimate remedy for the problems posed by preventive
detention is legislation which uses less constitutionally suspect, yet
more effective means to fight pretrial crime. Using pretrial services,
speedier trials, and detention based on crime while out on bail will
raise fewer constitutional problems than preventive detention while
preventing more crime on bail.
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